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INTRODUCTION
The hypotheticals prepared for this special symposium issue ask
if a lawyer can provide legal services to a family when one family
member yields major decision-making authority to another family
member. At stake is the disposition of significant individual and
family assets. The traditional model of legal representation would
require each family member to have an advocate protecting and
promoting his or her individual interests while negotiating a reasonable
* Professor and Tom Bevill Chairholder of Law, School of Law, University of Alabama.
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accommodation of the other family members' interests. The challenge
presented by the hypotheticals is whether an attorney can simulta-
neously represent apparent multiple interests without violating ethical
provisions.
The hypotheticals assume that the family as a unit has presented
itself to a lawyer seeking legal advice and assistance to accomplish a
plan already agreed to by the family. Each family presents a plan
conceived from the unique perspective of its philosophical, moral, and
practical understanding about the nature of family.1 It apparently
believes deeply in the presented plan and could accomplish its desires
without the aid of a lawyer. In fact, the probability is high that any
advice contrary to its plans or the recommendation that each member
individually seek separate counsel would be rejected. The question
becomes: Can a lawyer ethically provide legal services in a manner
which honors both the families' values and the lawyer's professional
values? Stated differently, are these multiple-client-conflict-of-interest
situations which the lawyer should not allow the client to waive the
protection afforded clients under our professionalism rules, even if the
clients consent after full disclosure and discussion of representing
clients with differing interests?
Proceeding from the premise that a lawyer is contemplating
offering legal services in the context of a family unit, the focus of this
article is on nonwaivable conflicts of interest in the area of family law.
Nonwaivability is suggested by the language in the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility2 (Model Code) and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct3 (Model Rules). My interest is whether the
Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations of the Model Code and
the Model Rules and Comments offer sufficient insight for the lawyer
considering multiple current client representation. As a policy matter,
which conflicts arising from family representations are nonwaivable?4
1. The family's sense of itself is derived from its ideological frame of reference, or how it
comes to hold its particular world view. Each family is different, and there may not be complete
agreement among the various members about which ideological frame of reference predominates.
See Steven H. Hobbs, We Are Family: Changing Times, Changing Ideologies and Changing Law,
14 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 511 (1985).
2. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
4. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.8. The rule, entitled "Conflict of Interest:
Prohibited Transactions," ostensibly is crafted to identify conflict situations that are nonwaivable.
A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer any substantial gift from a client;
"make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or
account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation"; or provide
financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation. MODEL
RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.8(c), (d), (e). However, not all of the provisions under Rule 1.8
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As a practical matter, when should it be obvious to a lawyer that he or
she should not represent the parties jointly?'
The rules suggest that a lawyer should not simultaneously
represent family members with differing or conflicting interests.6
However, this ethical protection can be waived by the clients after the
lawyer has given full and adequate disclosure of the nature, extent, and
risks of proceeding with a multiple representation However, the
Ethical Considerations in the Model Code and the Comments to the
Model Rules advise that in some situations, the multiple representation
should not proceed even with client consent-the conflict is nonwaiv-
able.'
This Article will explore ways of thinking through conflict of
interest questions when providing service to family members. Issues
of valid consent and adequate disclosure, while extremely relevant to
nonwaivability, are not addressed.9 My primary consideration will be
prohibit client consent to the representation or conflict situation. For example, with appropriate
consent, a lawyer may "enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client" or "accept
compensation for representing a client from one other than the client." MODEL RULES, supra
note 3, Rule 1.8(a), (f).
5. The comments to Model Rule 1.7 reflect the idea that there are practical reasons for not
representing multiple clients:
The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal
case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one
codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar
interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal and the requirements of
paragraph [1.71(b) are met.
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 7. This comment reflects the softness and
uncertainty in the Rules as to when a multiple current client representation should be declined.
6. For example:
Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer
may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and
wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise.
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 13. See also MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-15.
7. See Robert H. Aronson, An Overview of the Law of Professional Responsibility: The Rules
of Professional Conduct Annotated and Analyzed, 61 WASH. L. REV. 823, 846-48 (1986). See also
United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the right to conflict-
free counsel can be waived if waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent); United States v. Rico,
51 F.3d 495, 510 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that defendant validly waived her right to conflict-free
counsel after magistrate repeatedly advised her of her constitutional right to separate counsel and
warned her of potential risks).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Vaquero, 997 F.2d 78, 90 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1016 (1993) (holding that even with consent, representation is nonwaivable if the client
conflict would result in an inherently unfair trial). See also Kelley's Case, 627 A.2d 597, 600
(N.H. 1993) (stating that "there are situations in which, even [with client consent], a lawyer
should decline to represent that client.").
9. For a general discussion of those areas, see Lee E. Hejmanowski, An Ethical Treatment
of Attorneys' Personal Conflicts of Interest, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 881, 907, 937 (1993).
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on how the language of the ethical rules guides the lawyer in making
the decision. While some would argue for a bright-line rule to
determine nonwaivability, I recommend a subjective approach to
solving the nonwaivability dilemma:10 each lawyer should assess his
or her ability to provide legal services to multiple family members that
are consistent with the doctrinal principles of loyalty and zealousness.
The Article begins with a discussion of the unique challenges of
providing legal services to multiple family members. In Section II, the
Article moves to an examination of the doctrinal themes that structure
conflicts of interest analysis. Particular attention is paid to the
descriptive language of the rules. The Article then presents, in Section
III, an analytical framework for thoughtfully working through conflict
issues to determine if the conflict is nonwaivable. Finally, Section IV
concludes by considering the hypothetical problems in terms of the
analytical framework developed in Section III and informed by the
doctrinal themes presented in Section II.
I. REPRESENTING FAMILIES
In an earlier work, I presented the following definition of family:
A working, formal law-based definition of the family could be: "[A]
fundamental [legal] relationship established by birth, adoption or
choice in which persons are responsible to each other for basic
intellectual, emotional, physical, social[,] and spiritual nurture."
This relationship creates a unique species of legal rights and
obligations. A legal, domestic relationship is generally classified as
a status. Husband-wife, parent-child, and guardian-ward are the
universal status relationships that are domestic or familial in nature.
These status relationships are created, ordered, and protected by the
state. The concept can be expanded to include alternative forms of
family relationships, such as cohabitating heterosexual or homosexu-
al couples and surrogate parenting arrangements, which have been
given consideration in law.1"
There are times when a lawyer is called upon to represent the
interests of a family unit or to provide legal advice to two or more
family members who may have differing interests in the outcome of the
representation. For instance, one lawyer can assist a couple who seeks
10. See Peter R. Jarvis and Bradley F. Tellam, Nonwaivable Multiple Current Client
Conflicts, THE PROF. LAWYER 51 (1995).
11. Steven H. Hobbs, In Search of Family Value: Constructing a Framework for
Jurisprudential Discourse, 75 MARQ. L. R. 529, 534-35 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
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to draft an antenuptial agreement. 2 In certain limited circumstances,
one lawyer can handle a no-fault divorce on behalf of a couple.13
Family members injured in a common accident might sue the alleged
tortfeasor in one united action, even if one of the family members
might be partially responsible for the accident."4 Finally, there are
cases involving parallel proceedings on different matters, such as a
personal injury case brought on behalf of the family and handled by
the same lawyer who is representing one family member in a di-
vorce." Thus, the term "family representation" is used broadly to
describe not only the law of domestic relations (marriage, divorce,
adoption, etc.), but also legal issues based on the familial relationship
of the parties.' 6 In such instances of multiple representation when the
relationships between the parties are familial in nature, the parties'
12. See Kosik v. George, 452 P.2d 560 (Or. 1969); Lutz v. Schneider, 563 N.W.2d 90
(N.D. 1997).
13. See Klemm v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr.
509 (1977).
14. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1991).
15. See, e.g., In re Colestock, 461 N.E.2d 137 (Ind. 1984); In re Hockett, 734 P.2d 877 (Or.
1986); Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Frame, 433 S.E.2d 579 (W. Va. 1993).
16. Examples of the latter include estate planning and administration and torts committed
against family members or criminal charges, such as domestic violence, that affect the family
relationships. Also, lawyers have been known to represent family members charged with commit-
ting crimes as a family unit. Although not explored in this article, examples can also be found
in such areas as corporate law, where parent corporations and subsidiaries are referred to as
business families, or in businesses that are owned by families. See Arizona v. Padilla, 859 P.2d
191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993), where a criminal defendant sought post-conviction relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel because the defendant's lawyer represented family members in a drug case
and did not zealously or loyally represent each member. Defendant contended that:
[H]is lawyer, Albert Freeman, had a conflict of interest. Freeman, without obtaining
a waiver, represented defendant's wife, his brother, and his sister-in-law at a package
rate on drug charges stemming from the same investigation and involving the same
informant. Defendant argue[d] that this conflict prevented Freeman from pursuing a
better plea bargain by offering to have defendant testify against one or more of his
relatives, and from seeking a more favorable sentence by arguing at sentencing that
defendant had played a minor role in the family drug business, especially in relation to
his brother. Defendant also argue[d] that Freeman indirectly disparaged defendant at
his wife's sentencing, which immediately preceded his own, adversely affecting the
sentence in defendant's case.
Id. at 192. See also State v. Davis, 514 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1973) (remanding for new trial when
single attorney represented two brothers, both were convicted, and one appealed because his
defense conflicted with his brother's defense.) See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Opinion 390 (1995) (discussing conflicts of interest in the corporate family
context). See also Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Frame, 433 S.E.2d 579 (holding that firm's
representation of personal injury suit is "directly adverse" to its representation of another client
where the client will be cross-examined in the personal injury suit, even though she is not named
as a defendant). See also In re Hockett, 734 P.2d 877 (Or. 1986) (attorney attempted to handle
the business interests of two business partners while representing their respective wives in divorce
proceedings).
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legal interests are generally thought to be united; and yet, the parties
have interests that do, or can, become conflicting.17
Recent scholarship reflects a trend in the expanding and changing
nature of family law practice. Thomas Shaffer often urges that the
family is a civic community,'8 and that a lawyer can provide legal
services in pursuit of what is in the best interest of the family.19
Gerald LeVan calls upon lawyers to consider preservation of familial
relationships as a vital focus of legal representations.2" Patricia M.
Batt has argued for using an entity theory in representing families,
much like we use for representing a business.2' Russell Pearce
proposes offering families an "option" of deciding whether to obtain
representation as a family or as a collection of individuals.2
On the other hand, Teresa Stanton Collett vigorously opposes
treating the family as a unit and recommends against such an
engagement.23 Part of her objection is that she does not see where the
law recognizes the family as a unit in the same sense that the law gives
a legal existence to a business association. 4
17. See Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Opinion 1013 (Dec. 10, 1987) (permitting lawyer to
represent a widow and four of her six children in selling a farm left to the widow for life with a
remainder interest to the children as long as everyone sought the same result).
18. All of the deep sources of morals in our culture argue for the proposition that estate-
planning clients are not radically alone. Human relationships may be nurtured, nourished,
esteemed, and represented. The Hebraic family ethics of Moses, which are also the ethics of
Jesus, put created human beings in families and in families of families. This is true in the Torah
and Talmud, in the New Testament, in Aquinas' Summa Theologica, in the ethics of the Fathers
of the Reformation, and in modern Jewish and Christian ethics.
The aspirations of the first American legal craftsmen, both Puritan and Jeffersonian,
were communal-republican-aspirations: a civil covenant, a civic community in which
individuals give of their time and substance for the common good-and a body of law
that encouraged and sustained family and communal effort. We Americans are not
alone.
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Family as a Client-Conflict or Community?, 34 RES GESTAE 62, 64 (Aug.
1990).
19. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEXAS L. REV.
963 (1987).
20. See Gerald Le Van, Lawyers, Families and Feeling: Representing the Family Relationship,
5 PROB. & PROP. 19, 20 (Jan/Feb. 1991).
21. Patricia M. Batt, The Family Unit as Client: A Means to Address the Ethical Dilemmas
Confronting Elder Law Attorneys, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 319 (1992). See also MODEL RULES,
supra note 3, Rule 1.13.
22. See Russell Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts
in Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1256, 1294 (1994).
23. See Teresa Stanton Collett, The Ethics of Intergenerational Representation, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1453 (1994).
24. For example, she states:
In the absence of a coherent jurisprudence recognizing the family entity as separate from
the aggregate interests of the individual members, the lawyer attempting to represent
the family will have no universally recognized legal entity interposed between counsel
Family Law
Expanding on the notion of family as an entity or unit, other
scholars see families as a series of interrelated systems from which a
family draws resources to solve problems and address family needs.2"
The concept of systems is used to refer to a group of people who
interact as a functional whole. Neither people nor their problems
exist in a vacuum. Both are inextricably interwoven with broader
interactional systems, the most fundamental of which is the family.
The family is the primary and, except in rare instances, the most
powerful system to which a person ever belongs. . . . The physical,
social[,] and emotional functioning of family members is profoundly
interdependent, with changes in one part of the system reverberating
in other parts of the system.26
A system might include a spouse, a child, extended family members,
or a social agency that provides services and problem-solving resources
for families. For example, an individual seeking a divorce might call
upon his parents for financial support during the divorce.27 Or an
individual might turn to her parents to assume custody of her children
because the grandparents are in a better situation to meet the needs of
the children. These multiple systems create a web of interpersonal,
interdependent relationships through which individuals manage their
daily lives.28
I have used this approach in previous work exploring the ethical
management of assets for elder clients.29 My focus was on the
counseling role the lawyer plays in helping an elder client and his or
her family manage his or her assets at the end of life's journey." The
and individual family members.
Id. at 1493.
25. See NANCY BOYD-FRANKLIN, BLACK FAMILIES IN THERAPY: A MULTISYSTEMS
APPROACH (1989).
26. MONICA MCGOLDRICK & RANDY GERSON, GENOGRAMS IN FAMILY ASSESSMENT
4-5 (1985).
27. See Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Opinion 1631 (Feb. 7, 1995).
28. See Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Opinion 1626 (Feb. 17, 1995). The ethics committee
found that it was permissible for an attorney who served as guardian ad litem for the children in
a termination of parents' rights case to subsequently represent the Dept. of Social Service in an
appeal of the case.
29. See Steven H. Hobbs and Fay Wilson Hobbs, The Ethical Management of Assets for
Elder Clients: A Context, Role, and Law Approach, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1411 (1994); DIRK
R. DREUX IV & JOE M. GOODMAN, BUSINESS SUCCESSION PLANNING AND BEYOND: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO REPRESENTING FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESSES (1997).
30. While the lawyer has the elder person's interests as the ultimate concern of the
representation, part of the client's interest is care and concern for his or her family.
A contextual focus on the nature of the issues an elder client brings to the office and the
values implicit in elder law necessarily suggest a unique role for the attorney. The
attorney is truly a counselor who offers sage advice within the context of familial
1998]
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lawyer must recognize the multiple family systems context of the legal
problem and utilize those systems to facilitate the client's desires.3
This is a useful tool for planning how to deliver legal services to a
family.32  The lawyer can also better understand the legal and
nonlegal aspects of the family problem and identify resources for
solving the problem.33
Necessarily, serving the legal needs of families increases the
potential for ethical dilemmas.34 If a lawyer represents the family as
a unit or a system, how does the lawyer represent all of the individual
interests adequately?35 Does the representation promote the greater
good of the family while sacrificing some of the individual members'
legitimate interests? 6 The challenge is to determine if one can help
relationships. The primary focus is on empowering the elder person's navigation of the
last passage of life's journey.
Hobbs & Hobbs, supra note 29, at 1428.
31. Id. at 1422-25.
32. The multisystems approach enhances the information the lawyer gathers and considers
the client's needs in a broader context:
The multisystems approach can be a useful planning tool for thoughtful, competent
consultation with an elder person seeking a viable plan for asset management. Many
good lawyers already use this approach with initial intake questionnaires and the
completion of informational documents. The multisystems approach is certainly a more
comprehensive approach than, for example, simply drafting a will without concern for
the larger context of estate planning.
Id. at 1418.
33. Id. at 1428.
34. Dreux and Goodman present an excellent overview of the ethical complexities of
representing families, and they encourage lawyers to face the challenges:
Lawyers should feel confident in their ability to represent multiple family members in
appropriate circumstances. Admittedly, representation of this nature requires a certain
degree of circumspection and possesses a high degree of complexity, even difficulty, for
the lawyer in terms of professional ethical conduct. Moreover, these difficulties do not
allow a lawyer to exclude himself or herself from, or otherwise compromise, the
application of the formal ethical rules promulgated under either the Model Rules or
Model Code.
DREUX AND GOODMAN, supra note 29, at 115.
35. Professor Collett reaches this conclusion in her critique of representing a family as an
entity:
Only in family entity representation is the individual subsumed by the family and
therein lies its dangerous appeal. Yet the best interests of the family cannot be served
by denial of the individuality of each member. Entity representation, by its very nature,
demands this denial, and therefore can never safely accomplish that which is not already
possible within the three existing models.
Collet, supra note 23, at 1501.
36. It is not always possible to give every family member exactly what he or she desires in
large part because the interests that are being considered are never enough to go around. The
family members can either fight tooth and nail for what they individually believe they are entitled
to, or they can seek cooperation and accommodation of competing interests so that the family as
a whole prospers. Families seeking the greater good for their families may not find it if all its
1998] Family Law
the family without harming individuals, or whether withdrawal from
the representation is the appropriate course.
37
II. PARSING THE RULES - THE DOCTRINAL STRUCTURE
This section considers the doctrinal themes underlying the basic
elements of conflict of interest analysis.38 The basic elements are
loyalty, zealousness, confidentiality, and competence. The principle of
loyalty is based on the notion that there is only one client for whom
the lawyer holds a sacred trust.39 The lawyer is a fiduciary charged
with the care of the client's life, property, or legal rights."g The
principle of zealousness is founded on the idea that a lawyer must
exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client.4
members have individual, adversarial lawyers. For a discussion of these issues for the advisor to
a family business, see Glenn R. Ayres, Rough Family Justice: Equity in Family Business Succession
Planning, 3/1 FAM. Bus. REV. 3 (Spring 1990).
37. Gerald Le Van states the challenge as an opportunity:
Lawyers must find better ways of representing multiple parties (givers and receivers) in
the estate planning transaction. Most families want their relationships preserved and
want a single lawyer to help them through the process. As Mark Twain eloquently said,
"you never know someone until you share an inheritance with them." There must be
a place for lawyers to help families preserve assets and relationships. The two are not
necessarily exclusive. Lawyers, families, and feelings must work together.
Le Van, supra note 20, at 22.
38. Other scholars have explored this field with great detail. This article is premised on the
lawyer's response when the lawyer must decline the representation or withdraw because of a
conflict, even if the client has validly waived the conflict of interest protection. See Kevin
McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 823
(1992); Collett, supra note 23; and Pearce, supra note 22.
39. [A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at
all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first and only
duty...
2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (J. Nightengale ed. 1821) (quoting Lord Henry Brougham).
40. See Sanguinetti v. Rosen, 107 P. 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1906). Where a widow and her
children lost inherited property as a result of self-dealing by their attorney, the court set a high
standard for lawyer conduct:
An attorney at law should be a paragon of candor, fairness, honor, and fidelity in all his
dealings with those who place their trust in his ability and integrity, and he will at all
times, and under all circumstances, be held to the full measure of what he ought to be.
Equity would indeed be impotent if a trusted legal advisor could profit by withholding
the benefit of his special knowledge and skill, or by giving false counsel during the
continuance of a relation in the highest sense confidential and fiduciary.
Id. at 563.
41.. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, Canon 5 and EC 5-1. See also MODEL RULES, supra
note 3, Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (stating that "[a] lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to
the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."). Moreover, the
court system assumes the adversarial model.
[Each attorney,] by his zealous preparation and presentation of facts and law, enables
the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind and to render
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Thus, the lawyer protects the client's interest without prejudice or
bias.42  Interests of third persons or interests personal to the lawyer
should not influence the advice rendered to the client.43 The princi-
ple of confidentiality requires the lawyer to hold inviolate the confi-
dences and secrets of the client." In the multiple-client situation,
clients can consent to the conflicting representation after full disclo-
sure.45  This requires the client to give the lawyer permission to
disclose confidences and secrets sufficient to inform the other client of
the conflict. 46  Finally, in simultaneously servicing the legal needs of
multiple clients, the lawyer must take care to perform with the
competence and skill of a reasonable lawyer in similar situations.
47
The pursuit of professional excellence is paramount.
48
The larger meaning of these principles is wrapped in the
generalized, descriptive wording of the rules, ethical considerations, and
comments on conflicts. The language of the rules defines the
principles by using the same or similar words in the descriptive
examples of conflict situations. For example, in a multiple-client
family representation, the lawyer would have to represent differing or
conflicting interests.49 Also, dual representation is said to diminish
the loyalty given to each client."0 We are further advised by the
impartial judgments. The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system
are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-19 (internal citations omitted).
42. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 2-30.
43. See id. at EC 2-21, 5-21, 5-22, 5-23. See also MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.8(f),
Rule 1.7 cmts. 6, 10.
44. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 4-101; MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6.
45. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-16; MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(b)(2)
cmts. 12, 13.
46. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 5.
47. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980).
48. In thinking about professional excellence, the example of Charles Hamilton Houston,
civil rights litigator and former Dean of Howard Law School, comes to mind. It was once said
of Houston that the call to the practice of law "was a call for the superlative." Spottswood W.
Robinson, III, No Tea for the Feeble: Two Perspectives on Charles Hamilton Houston, 20 How.
L.J. 1, 6 (1977).
49. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-14; ABA Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 6.
Canon 6 provides the classic definition of conflicting interests:
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
50. The Model Code states:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes
his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on
behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises whenever a lawyer is
asked to represent two or more clients who may have differing interests, whether such
interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant.
[Vol. 22:57
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descriptive language that serving multiple-family clients would have an
adverse affect on the representation"' or would impair the judgment
of the lawyer.5 2 Having more than one client could keep the lawyer
from exercising the requisite zealousness on behalf of each client.
Further, the Model Code suggests that it will be obvious to a
reasonable lawyer when a dual family representation should not be
taken53 or when, as the Model Rules implore, a disinterested lawyer
would not accept such a representation.5 4
All these admonitions are descriptive of the general principles, but
they fail to provide concrete, substantive understanding of when certain
conflicts are nonwaivable. To obtain insight into what these admoni-
tions mean, a brief review of some cases involving conflicting interests
in the family context is helpful. The descriptive language of these
terms often overlap and contain some of the multiple meanings implicit
in the principles discussed at the beginning of this section. The
doctrinal themes underlying the basic elements of conflict of interest
will now be explored.
A. Differing or Conflicting Interests
The language of the rules speaks to the inadvisability of represent-
ing "differing interests, whether such interests be conflicting, inconsis-
tent, diverse[] or otherwise discordant." 5  The spirit of the rules
suggests that differing interests or conflicting interests have a consistent
and synonymous meaning. Reference is often made to Canon 6 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which states:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, on behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.5 6
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-14 (internal citations omitted).
51. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-17.
52. Id.
53. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-105.
54. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7, cmt. 5.
55. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-14.
56. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, Canon 6. See also Rhode Island Ethics Op. 94-24 (May
5, 1994). The attorney was representing the income beneficiary and remainderman of a trust in
a suit against the trustee for failure to appropriately invest the trust corpus. An attorney in
promoting the interest of the income beneficiary (trustee should invest for greater income) may
be in potential conflict when representing remainderman (trustee should invest for long-term
growth).
1998]
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By general application, this is what is meant by differing or conflicting
interests.3 7 A lawyer is pressed simultaneously to hold opposite and
equally compelling positions and to be faithful to both.58 In the
context of family representation, it occurs when interests of family
members are adverse to one another.59 The Model Rules also support
this meaning.6"
In a family context, differing or conflicting interests are most
evident in a representation of both husband and wife in a divorce.
While often frowned upon and, in some states, strictly prohibited,61
one lawyer can represent a divorcing couple in limited circumstanc-
es.62 In Klemm v. Superior Court of Fresno County,63 the leading case
on this subject, the California court allowed an attorney, who was a
family friend, to represent both spouses in a noncontested divorce
where the conflict was merely potential and where there was found to
be full disclosure and informed consent.
64
57. See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 314-16 (1986).
58. Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Op. 741 (Jan. 20, 1986). A lawyer cannot provide legal
services both to the adoptive parents and the biological parent. Other ethics committees have
come to the same conclusions. See State Bar of Wisconsin Formal Ethics Opinion E-88-4; ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1523 (1987).
59. The dictionary definition of "adverse" lends color to the inquiry:
Opposed; contrary; in resistance or opposition to a claim, application, or proceeding.
Having opposing interests; having interests for the preservation of which opposition is
essential.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 53 (6th ed. 1990).
In the family context, a lawyer cannot represent a husband in an uncontested divorce and
simultaneously defend the wife in a criminal matter. Virginia State Bar Legal Ethics Op. 1015
(Jan. 5, 1988). Attorney cannot represent minor children whose mother was killed in an accident,
the mother's estate in a wrongful death suit, and the children's grandparents who are the
guardians and administrators of the estate. Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm.
Op. 93-24 (Jan. 1994).
60. Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or
carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other
responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would
otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (b) addresses such situations.
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 4.
61. See In re Breen, 552 A.2d 105 (N.J. 1989) (representing husband and wife in divorce
is impermissible conflict of interest). See also Oregon Ethics Op. 515 (1988) (prohibiting joint
representation in divorce even when the "spouses have limited assets, no children, no disputes
concerning the distribution of assets and liabilities, and neither spouse is seeking support");
Mississippi State Bar Ethics Comm. Op. 80 (1983); ABA/BNA Manual 801:5104; New
Hampshire Ethics Op. 1986-7/2 (1986).
62. See Perry v. Perry, 406 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (holding that lawyer was
able to preserve neutrality and separation agreement was fair); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 303(c) (1970); 9A U.L.A. 126 (1979).
63. 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1977).
64. Id. at 900; 142 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
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Conversely, the dangers involved in such dual representations
were evident in the case of Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Dineen.65
There, the attorney, James Dineen, represented the husband before the
marriage and provided legal services to both husband and wife during
the marriage. In the spring of 1982, Dineen agreed to assist the couple
in pursuing a divorce.66  The representation included meeting with
the parties to work out a settlement agreement, explaining the concept
of division of marital property, and drafting the divorce complaint.
The husband was listed as the plaintiff with Dineen as his attorney,
and the wife, as party defendant, was served with the complaint in the
attorney's office. The wife continued to believe that Dineen was her
attorney. 6
8
The nature of this attorney-client relationship was further
complicated in July of 1982, when Dineen was retained to defend the
wife "on a civil complaint for operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol. '69  While the civil trial was heard on
September 20, 1982, Dineen continued to assist the couple in securing
a no-fault divorce before and after that date. In October of 1982, the
wife committed herself to a substance abuse rehabilitation center.
During her stay, the husband personally delivered a written divorce
agreement prepared by Dineen. She signed it even though the terms
were different than the ones to which she believed they had agreed in
Dineen's office.70 Subsequently, on December 22, 1982, she called
Dineen, explained that she was undergoing treatment for alcohol abuse,
and asked the attorney to obtain a continuance of the divorce case so
that she might obtain separate counsel.
Dineen did obtain a continuance, but he also filed an amended
divorce complaint alleging that "the wife was guilty of cruel and
65. 500 A.2d 262 (Me. 1985).
66. Dineen did discuss some of the risks in handling the divorce for both parties and
warned them that "he could only handle the matter if the couple prepared a full agreement of
their [sic] mutual understanding concerning the issues and terms of the divorce." Id. at 263. He




70. She signed the agreement in spite of her misgivings about some of its terms:
She noticed that certain terms in the agreement had changed since the meeting between
the [attorney], her husband[,] and herself: (1) the amount recited for the husband's
child support payments was lower than that to which they had agreed, and (2) there was
an added clause that allowed the husband to claim tax exemptions for their two minor
children. The wife testified that, at this point, she formulated the opinion that she had
been misled by the [attorney's] explanation of what constituted "marital property."
Bar v. Dineen, 500 A.2d at 263.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
abusive treatment and of gross and confirmed habits of intoxication for
the use of liquor." 7' He further sought, ex parte for the husband,
custody of the minor children alleging "the wife's unfitness to care for
her children because of her alcohol abuse. '72  The wife eventually
prevailed on a motion to compel Dineen to withdraw from representing
her husband.
In Dineen, the husband and wife looked to the lawyer for legal
advice, and he did little to alert the parties to the dangers of dual
representation.73 The court found inadequate disclosure of the nature
of the conflict, despite the lawyer's protestation to the contrary.
74
Further, the lawyer had no intent of serving two clients, as he was
"acting with the intent of furthering the husband's interests at the
expense of the wife's."'7'  The wife's interests in preserving the
confidence concerning her substance abuse differed from the husband's
interests in using this information against her. Nonetheless, Dineen
used the wife's valiant efforts in overcoming substance abuse against
her. Clearly, the lawyer's loyalty was in the exclusive province of the
husband to the detriment of the wife.
B. Loyalty
As suggested earlier in discussing the principle of loyalty, the
interests of a client are a lawyer's sacred trust. Loyalty demands that
the lawyer's personal interest and the interests of others (including
other clients) should not be allowed to harm the client.
In the family law context, such loyalty is often implicated when
the lawyer in a dual, family representation may be forced to disclose
71. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
72. Id. at 264.
73. Mr. Dineen contends that he was not consulted as a lawyer in the divorce matter,
but rather, fulfilled the function of a scrivener. Thus, given the nature of this limited
role in relation to the parties, nothing existed to warrant a conclusion that he was
representing differing interests. The testimony of both the husband and wife conflict
with the appellant's characterization of his role. Their testimony shows that, in fact, the
appellant gave legal advice to both parties concerning the terms of their divorce
settlement agreement and that, ultimately, certain terms of the agreement were changed
to favor the husband's interests over the wife's.
Id. at 265-66.
74. The appellant asserts that the wife was aware of the long standing relationship
between the appellant and her husband, and such awareness made disclosure
unnecessary. We find that the record supports the single justice's finding that the
appellant failed to adequately disclose to the wife the exact nature of his relationship to
the husband, who was a party adverse to the wife.
Bar v. Dineen, 500 A.2d at 265.
75. Id. at 265.
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evidence of domestic violence. This presents a classic example of
divided loyalties. Do you report the domestic abuser, or do you not
offer protection to the abused spouse? The dilemma is further
compounded when the principle of loyalty is measured as a component
of effective assistance of counsel.
Such complicated issues of loyalty were demonstrated in United
States v. Rico.76 In that case, Manuel and Debra Rico, a husband and
wife, were convicted of drug trafficking. They sought to appeal the
conviction based, in part, on the failure of the trial court to suppress
evidence obtained during a pre-arrest search of their home and vehicle.
The wife appealed specifically on the ground that she received an
unfair trial because her attorney represented both her and her husband,
thus depriving her of a right to counsel free of conflict. She claimed
she was an abused and battered spouse who was forced to participate
in the drug ring under duress and that, had her attorney offered such
evidence in her defense, she would have been exonerated or the charges
against her would have been mitigated.
The Court of Appeals considered the standard analysis for
determining whether this dual representation was constitutionally
impermissible:
As with many other rights, though, the right to a conflict-free
counsel is not absolute. It can be waived if (1) the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and (2) the conflict is not
so severe as to undermine the integrity of the judicial system. We
consider first whether there was an actual conflict of interest; if so,
whether Debra did in fact freely and validly waive her right to a
representation by a conflict-free attorney; and if that too is so,
whether the conflict is nevertheless so severe as to be unwaivable as
a matter of law.77
The court, after assuming that there was an actual conflict,
considered whether the wife validly waived her right to a conflict-free
counsel. The court noted that the magistrate and the counsel fully and
76. 51 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 1995). The husband and wife were adamant about using the
same attorney. The magistrate judge at the preliminary hearing warned the wife, Debra:
You [Debra] have the right to a lawyer who is loyal to you, and there may be some
potential conflict between a defense that is in your husband's best interest and a defense
that is in your best interest. And this often happens between codefendants, that
evidence that would tend to exculpate one of them tends to incriminate the other.
Id. at 510. The leading cases on effective assistance of counsel are Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), and Nix v. Whitesides, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
77. Id. at 508 (internal citations omitted).
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properly advised her of the risk of the dual representation.78 There-
fore, she validly consented to waive her right to a conflict-free counsel.
Nonetheless, the court further inquired whether this conflict was
nonwaivable:
[B]ut our determination that Debra validly waived her right to
conflict-free counsel does not end our inquiry. For if the conflict is
so severe as to render a trial inherently unfair, then the integrity of
the judicial system has been undermined, and the accused has been
deprived of [her] right to effective assistance of counsel.79
In Rico, there was no evidence of domestic violence against the
wife, even though there was evidence that the husband abused his
stepdaughters.8" Consequently, no damage was done to the system
of justice because counsel had not sacrificed the interest of the wife by
failing to raise the defense of duress of battered spouse." The court
further concluded that the dual representation did not "render Debra's
trial inherently unfair, thereby making her right to conflict-free counsel
unwaivable.... 82
Fairness and justice are necessary conditions of loyalty. The court
was concerned about whether the wife would receive a fair trial in light
of her counsel's inability to vigorously pursue all of her options.
Furthermore, the integrity of the judicial system might be impugned
if a defendant did not have access to her full panoply of rights because
of her allegiance to an alleged domestic abuser.83 But as such cases
imply, if a knowing choice is made by the family, the courts can honor
that autonomous decision to stand as a united family.
78. Id. at 510.
79. Id. at 511 (internal quotes & citations omitted).
80. Id. at 509.
81. The opinion in Rico stated:
The record before us indicates that there are precious few facts on which a defense
counsel could credibly construct an argument that Debra became involved in this multi-
kilogram narcotics operation and continued her involvement for a protracted period
because she was under duress or was a battered spouse, especially considering that
Debra herself was apparently adamant in her refusal to allow either defense to be raised.
51 F.3d at 511.
82. Id.
83. Some distinction could be made between civil representation and criminal representation
of a family. The right to counsel of choice in a criminal context has constitutional implications,
as Rico suggests. Loyalty, zealousness, confidentiality, and competence apply nonetheless. But
see Dowell v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 351 S.E.2d 915 (Va. App. 1987).
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C. Impaired or Adversely Affected Judgment
The subtle problem in representing differing interests is that the
lawyer's independent professional judgment can be impaired or affected
to the detriment of one client. Objective, lawyer-like judgment may
be shadowed by favoring one client over another or pursuing one
specific result without reference to a wide range of options.84 In
either event, the lawyer must be attuned to the subtle pressures of
influence that might affect professional judgment and must be prepared
to consider whether the matter represents a nonwaivable conflict.
Impaired or adversely affected judgment can be measured in two
ways. First, a lawyer with divided loyalties may provide inadequate
representation. 5 The emphasis here is that the multiple conflict so
impairs the representation that "a lawyer cannot consider, recommend
or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of
the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests." 6 Second, the divided
loyalty of the lawyer may affect the relationship with the client.8 7
That is, the client may come to distrust and lose faith in the lawyer.88
Both measurements of impaired judgment were evident in the
Dineen case, discussed above, where the lawyer used information from
the wife to her disadvantage because he was determined to help the
husband. 9 Based on the state's conflict of interest rule, the court
84. See Dowell v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 915. Defendant had a grand larceny
conviction vacated on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel because her lawyer also
represented her mother and stepfather in the same matter. The mother and stepfather were called
as witnesses by the Commonwealth and the lawyer did not cross-examine his clients.
85. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(b)(1).
86. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 4. In Dowell, the lawyer objected,
unsuccessfully, to having two of his clients testify against the third. 315 S.E.2d at 915. The
lawyer chose not to cross-examine the witnesses. The court cast the issue as an impermissible
conflict between competing choices:
If a witness's testimony will incriminate both the witness and the defendant, the
attorney must choose between negotiating concessions in exchange for the witness's
testimony or deterring the witness from testifying in order to protect the defendant.
Consequently, the effect of such testimony would be to create a conflict of interest.
Id. at 917.
87. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-19. See Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Op. 1144 (Oct.
26, 1988). A lawyer represented Client 1 in her divorce, and then Client 2 in her divorce.
During preliminary filings, it is alleged that Client 1's estranged husband had committed adultery
with Client 2. The lawyer had divided loyalties as Client 1 could be called as a witness and be
subject to cross-examination by her own attorney.
88. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 8. See also Comm. on Legal Ethics
v. Frame, 433 S.E.2d 579.
89. Dineen, 500 A.2d 262. The court found that not only did the lawyer violate the conflict
of interest rule, but he also failed to preserve the confidences and secrets of the wife:
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concluded that the lawyer should not have undertaken the representa-
tion of husband and wife because his "judgment was likely to be
adversely affected by the acceptance of such employment."9" Further
evidence of his impaired professional judgment is found in the fact
that, after he became openly adverse to the wife, he refused to heed the
advice of the trial judge to withdraw from representing the husband.9"
The case of Blum v. Blum9 2 provides another example of im-
paired or affected judgment. In that case, a husband and wife brought
a handwritten draft of a divorce settlement agreement to their family
lawyer who attempted to continue to represent them both.93  After
first giving her approval, Mrs. Blum later attempted to have the
settlement agreement set aside. The property division was so one-
sided that it "shock[ed] the conscience of this court."9" The court
found that Mr. Blum was "the dominant force in the marriage" and he
dominated the terms of the divorce.9" Their lawyer acquiesced to Mr.
Blum's demands to the detriment of Mrs. Blum's interests. Moreover,
even if Mr. and Mrs. Blum could negotiate their settlement agreement
on equal terms, their lawyer failed miserably in advising them of the
nature and extent of the potential and actual conflict of interest
between them.96
The single justice found that "without obtaining the informed consent of the wife,
[appellant] used information he received from her." The use to which appellant put the
information is reflected in the amended divorce complaint that charged the wife with
"gross and confirmed habits of intoxication from the use of liquor .... " The single
justice found that the appellant first gained this information from the wife in December,
1982, at a time when the wife believed she was still represented by the appellant.
Id. at 266-67.
90. Id. at 266 (internal citation omitted).
91. For example:
In chambers, the judge warned Mr. Dineen that his conduct was susceptible to charges
of violation of the bar rules and suggested that he seriously consider withdrawing
voluntarily from the case. The appellant disregarded the warning and continued to
represent the husband.
Id. at 264. In the disciplinary proceeding, this conduct garnered an additional ethic violation for
failing to withdraw when continued representation would cause a violation of the rules of ethics.
Id. at 267.
92. 477 A.2d 289 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
93. Id. at 291.
94. Id. at 292.
95. Id. at 295.
96. In this case, Mr. and Mrs. Blum approached an attorney who had represented them
in the past and presented him with their separation agreement. Counsel never informed
the parties of their respective rights, never advised the parties of any potential conflicts
of interest which [sic] might arise as a result of his representing both of them. Not
surprisingly, the potential conflict which (sic] exists in every domestic case developed
into an actual conflict after the agreement was signed.
Id. at 296.
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The Maryland version of the Model Code, case law, and good
judgment demand disclosure of the nature of the conflict, even if the
Blums' lawyer, "believed that he was merely acting as a 'scribe' with
regard to the Blum's [sic] separation agreement. . .. "9' He left open
the real possibility that his representation would come to naught
because the settlement agreement could be challenged and set aside.98
The nonwaivability of the conflicts is suggested because the
Blums' lawyer and Dineen could not effectively exercise independent
professional judgment in a manner that protected their respective
clients. In the Blum case, the lawyer's services were dominated by one
of the spouses. The adverse affect on his judgment is ensured by how
much it impaired his relationship with the other spouse. In Dineen,
the lawyer did not consider options that would have suited both
clients' needs in terms of what was best for the family and the
children. He went so far as to aggressively oppose the interest of one
of his clients. The adverse effect on his judgment is measured by the
inadequate representation of both clients. Neither lawyer represented
their respective multiple clients in a professional manner.
D. Zealousness
True zealousness calls for the attorney, within the bounds of the
law, to press for every advantage and pursue every legal avenue
available on behalf of each client.99 All must be considered, even if
prudence and tactical strategy counsel against using every opportunity
to advance the client's cause. °° A dual representation of family
members may unnecessarily limit the options of the attorney, causing
97. Blum, 477 A.2d at 297.
98. The case was remanded so that the lower court could reconsider whether the agreement
should be set aside based on the standards articulated on appellate review. Id. at 299. See also
In re Estate of Benker, 331 N.W. 193 (Mich. 1982).
99. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.3 cmt. 1:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction
or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical
measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf.
See also, MODEL CODE, supra note 2, Canon 7; DR 7-101(A)(1). In Dowell, the court recognized
the zealousness conundrum of a lawyer representing family members in a criminal case:
Finally, if the witness's testimony is expected to exonerate the witness and incriminate
the defendant, the attorney, if he does not use the witness's [F]ifth [A]mendment right
to protect the defendant, will be forced to cross-examine the witness, his own client.
If he must cross-examine the witness as an adverse witness, he cannot be expected to
zealously attempt to discredit one of his clients to protect another.
351 S.E.2d at 917-18.
100. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-1, 7-8; MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.2.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
a "fail[ure] to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reason-
ably available means permitted by law. . .. ""'
Such was the case in Tyson v. District Court for the Fourth Judicial
District,10 2 where a husband and wife defended themselves against
criminal charges from an alleged drive-by shooting. Robert and
Barbara Tyson endeavored to have one attorney conduct their defense.
They claimed to have a unity of interest in conducting a joint defense
in which neither wished to pursue a guilty plea and neither wished to
testify against the other.1"3 The defendants were, in effect, saying
they would rather stand and fight together as a married couple than
sacrifice one for the other with separate counsel pursuing separate
deals.
At a preliminary hearing, the judge reviewed the potential conflict
issues. The court even assigned separate, advisory counsel on the
conflict issue. 10 4 Each defendant was questioned thoroughly by the
advisory counsel and given extensive information about the hazards of
dual representation."°S Each counsel (who could certainly be charac-
terized as disinterested) reported back to the court that his client had
made a knowing waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel. 0 6 The
court initially permitted the dual representation. 107
As the trial approached, the court reconsidered its initial decision,
weighing the defendants' right to counsel of their choice and their right
to an effective counsel. Defense counsel had rejected an offered plea
agreement for the wife of probation and no jail in exchange for giving
testimony against her husband. In his order reversing his previous
position, the trial judge ordered defense counsel not to represent either
husband or wife, concluding:
[T]he court has looked at the nature of the defenses, the fact that
the evidence is stronger against one person than the other, the
preliminary hearing, that one cannot have zealous representation of
one Defendant when that can hurt the other Defendant.
And I've taken into consideration that both Defendants have
said, "I'm not going to take any deals. I'm not going to take any
offers." However, even doing that, the court feels that any defense
101. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, DR 7-101(A)(1).
102. 891 P.2d 984 (Colo. 1995). See also In re Cohen, 853 P.2d 286 (Or. 1993) (regarding
issue of domestic violence as evidence against a family member).
103. Tyson, 891 P.2d at 988.
104. Id. at 987.
105. Id. at 987-88.
106. Id. at 991.
107. Id. at 988.
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attorney worth his salt would try to get a plea bargain, . . and it's
hard to get an appropriate or better plea bargain for your client
when that would hurt the other client that you are representing
[sic].10
8
In a four to three decision, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed
the trial court on the ground that the Tysons had been deprived of
their right to counsel of their choice.0 9 The court found that the
Tysons knowingly "waive[d] their right to a conflict-free representation
•.. [and their] right to later assert a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel as caused by the conflict of interest.""'  Although it consid-
ered the integrity of the judicial process, the court gave greater weight
to the Tysons' Sixth Amendment right to counsel of their choice."'
Their lawyer was zealously pursuing what the clients perceived to be
their joint, united interests.
In dissent, Justice Erickson focused on the impact the holding
would have on the fairness and integrity of the justice system. 112
The dissent recounted significant evidence which tended to demon-
strate that the husband was primarily culpable for the alleged offense.
Justice Erickson would have emphasized:
The interest of the public in the fair and proper administration of
justice includes concerns that trials be conducted in a evenhanded
manner; that the participants in the adversary process ... be
protected from unfair tactics; and that the courts maintain the
integrity of the judicial system and the highest ethical standards of
the legal profession." 3
These ethical standards include recognizing when a conflict of
interest is nonwaivable, such as when it would be virtually impossible
for the attorney to effectively represent both defendants. 4  In other
108. Tyson, 891 P.2d at 989.
109. Id. at 992.
110. Id. at 992.
111. Id. at 990.
112. I dissent because the majority unnecessarily limits the discretion of a trial judge
to disqualify a lawyer from representing a defendant when an obvious and actual conflict
of interest exists that would deprive the defendant of the right to effective assistance of
counsel.
Id. at 992.
113. Id. at 994.
114. The dissent elaborated on the appropriate ethical standards in a critical footnote:
Without passing judgment on the attorney seeking to represent both defendants, I
invoke two ethical concepts. First, the comment to Rule 1.7 of the Colorado Rules of
Professional Conduct (Conflicts of Interest) states "when a disinterested lawyer would
conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances,
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words, the conflict would mute zealous representation by the lawyer.
Such muted representation goes against the fundamental grain of our
adversarial system, which assumes vigorous advocacy of every lawful
advantage for the client."'
While I share Justice Erickson's concern for the integrity of the
judicial system, the case is complicated by the fact that the husband
and wife, even with two lawyers, would most likely pursue the same
ends. Conducting their defense in the manner in which they choose
is ultimately their decision and their right."6  This is particularly
true in a criminal case where the Sixth Amendment is implicated.
However, the lawyer's ethical response to the clients' choice is
informed by his or her sense of professionalism. The Preamble to the
Model Rules states:
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from
conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system[,] and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright
person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional
Conduct prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the
framework of these Rules[,] many difficult issues of professional
discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the
exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the
basic principles underlying the Rules." 7
In balancing competing professional values, the lawyer can and should
be guided by his or her own sense of professional duty. " 8 As will
be discussed in Section III, the lawyer must assess his or her ability to
the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation
on the basis of the client's consent." The present case illustrates a situation when a
lawyer cannot properly ask each client to waive the conflict. Second, the Standard for
Criminal Justice 4-1.6 requires that "[c]lient interests [be] paramount." The standard
insists a lawyer "represent the client's legitimate interests.
Tyson, 891 P.2d at 994 n.7.
115. See The Zealous Lawyer: Is Winning the Only Thing?, 4 REPORT FROM THE CENTER
FOR PHILOSOPHY & PUB. POL'Y I (Winter 1984), for a discussion of the wisdom of the
zealousness tradition.
116. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 7-101(A)(1), EC 5-12, 7-7, 7-8; MODEL RULES,
supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a).
117. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Preamble.
118. Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to
test the extent to which his actions should rise above the minimum standards. But in
the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of his
profession and of the society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the
incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct.
[Vol. 22:57
Family Law
conduct the representation as requested by the multiple clients.119
Unless subject to a court order to continue with the representation,
12 0
a lawyer could withdraw if the representation is at odds with his or her
sense of professional values.
21
E. The Disinterested Lawyer and the Obviousness Test
Implicit in the language of the rules is that there is some general,
objective agreement as to when a multiple client conflict is nonwaiv-
able. The cases examined on this point suggest that the lawyers should
have known better and not taken on the representations. The lessons
learned suggest that a reasonable lawyer would not represent a couple
in divorce or in a joint criminal defense. This section considers the
assumption of nonwaivability as a function of reasonable reflection.
The Model Rules establish a "disinterested lawyer" test to
determine if a conflict is nonwaivable:
A client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict.
However, as indicated in paragraph (b)(1) with respect to material
limitations on representation of a client, when a disinterested lawyer
would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation
under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for
such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's
consent. 122
The Model Code admonishes a lawyer not to proceed unless "it is
obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each. .. .
At times, even with client consent, a lawyer should decline the
representation.124
In Kelley's Case,2 ' a disciplinary proceeding, two lawyers were
retained to assist a mother and a daughter in settling the estate of the
mother's husband and the daughter's father. The lawyers advised the
mother and daughter "that their interests are coincidental but not
identica1. ' ' 12 They further reviewed Rule 1.7 of the New Hampshire
119. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 2-30; MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.16
cmt. 7.
120. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.16(c).
121. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.16(b)(3); MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-8.
122. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 5. See Tyson, in which the dissenting
judge invoked the disinterested lawyer standard. 891 P.2d at 994, n.7.
123. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-105(C) (emphasis supplied).
124. But cf. Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Op. 728 (Nov. 11, 1985) (holding that a lawyer may
prepare reciprocal wills for a husband and wife if it is obvious that he can adequately represent
the interest of each).
125. 627 A.2d 597 (N.H. 1993).
126. Id. at 598.
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Rules of Professional Responsibility with their clients and had them
sign a conflict consent waiver. 127 The potential conflict arose under
the will, which provided the daughter with the proceeds from half of
a two part trust. The mother would receive proceeds from both parts
of the trust. 128  Part of the total estate was devised to a third party
who may have improperly influenced the testator. If the wife elected
to challenge the will and take her statutory share, she could stand to
receive a larger portion of the estate. However, such a challenge ran
the risk of the daughter not receiving as much from the trust estab-
lished for her benefit.
The probate court disqualified the two lawyers from representing
the daughter, finding "that a disinterested lawyer would conclude that
[the daughter] should not agree to the representation under the
circumstances . . 9 In the disciplinary proceeding, the lawyers
were publicly censured under Model Rule 1.7(b) because the respective
interests of their clients were in clear conflict. The court found:
The respondents' representation of the two women, who had
substantially different interests in the estate, presented a fundamen-
tal conflict and violated Rule 1.7(b).... The potential conflict in
this case would be so clearly fundamental to a disinterested attorney
that undertaking the joint representation was per se unreason-
able. 3°
The court characterized this as a "fundamental" conflict. 131  I
take that to mean that, for the lawyers to proceed with their legal
theory, they would enhance one client's position at the possible expense
of the other. This form of direct, adverse conflict has been also labeled
"impermissible."' 3 2 By extension, if the lawyer's personal interest or
the interest of a third party were adverse to one or more of the
represented family members, this too would be a fundamental,
impermissible conflict.
33
127. Id. at 599.
128. Id.
129. Kelly's Case, 627 A.2d at 600.
130. Id.
131. The Model Rules give one example of a fundamental nonwaivable conflict: "For
example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are
fundamentally antagonistic to each other .. " MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 12.
132. See In re Boyles's Case, 611 A.2d 618 (N.H. 1992).
133. See In re Captran Creditors Trust, 104 B.R. 442 (U.S. Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989). A
debtor motioned to disqualify creditors' attorney in a bankruptcy proceeding based on
impermissible conflict between attorney and his clients, who were being challenged for bad faith
filing of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor. The court found that even
with informed client consent, a disinterested lawyer would not ask for a waiver of conflict
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The court also focused on the reasonableness of the joint
representation. This reflects the language of parts (a) and (b) of Model
Rule 1.7, which requires the lawyer to reasonably believe that the
representation will not be adversely affected.134 The reasonableness
of a multiple representation is often determined by assessing many
different factors13 as well as the role played by the lawyer in the
representation.136
SUMMARY
Family clients come to attorneys for legal services in times of
family crisis and in times of celebration. When family clients present
the most personal, intimate issues of their lives, they are telling
lawyers, "We trust you, and we are entrusting our family's most prized
possessions with you. We trust that you will not harm any of us and
that you will do your utmost to resolve our family crisis."
Representing families is really about attitude. One has to have the
right mindset to be able to successfully handle families in distress. It
takes special skills and a people-friendly personality to have the right
attitude to be a counselor at law in family matters. There must be
openness, honesty, and humility to fully explore the family's desire and
to confront whether you can fairly and competently help it achieve its
stated desire. Clearly, the lawyers in Dineen and Blum overreached
that boundary to the detriment of the parties. In Rico and Tyson, the
families expressed desire to stick together, no matter the costs, and
their wish for one lawyer was honored. In Kelley's Case, the court
erred on the side of caution and prohibited the family representation.
However, in that situation it may have been possible to work out a
compromise that ostensibly would not have pitted the mother and
daughter against one another. The next section will explore further
protection. In approving the disqualification, the court found:
In the present instance, it is clear that Warren's own interest[s] are in direct conflict
with [those of] Mills and Smock[,] who are also being sued. In this case, it is also clear
that Warren's conduct, as well as that of Mills and Smock[,] will be at issue, which will
require Warren to justify the actions of his clients in filing the involuntary Petition
against the Debtor, as well as his own behavior and motivation with respect to the same.
Id. at 445.
134. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(a), (b).
135. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for adverse effect
include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients
involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict
will arise[,] and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. The
question is often one of proximity and degree.
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 11.
136. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 13.
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possible methods for distinguishing cases where nonwaivability is the
issue.
III. THE ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT OF
INTEREST RULES OF ETHICS
In looking at the doctrinal structure of the rules, Section II of this
Article explored the theoretical underpinning of conflict of interest
analysis. The descriptive language of the rules was explored to obtain
a deeper understanding of the doctrinal themes implicit in the basic
elements of conflict of interest analysis. This section will consider the
analytical structure of the conflict of interests rules. The focus is on
identifying the process necessary to frame a conflict of interest analysis.
How does a lawyer recognize a conflict of interest, determine the
nature of the conflict, and respond appropriately, given the context of
the representation? Of particular concern is how the rules shape the
analysis of a lawyer in deciding if a conflict is nonwaivable. After
considering the Model Code and the Model Rules, I will propose a
basic structural framework for analyzing these questions.
A. The Model Code
The conflict of interest rules in the Model Code are placed under
Canon 5, which states that a lawyer should exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client.137 The rules admonish
the lawyer not to let anything or anyone affect her professional judg-
ment.13 Expressed in terms of accepting or continuing professional
employment, the rules have two primary reference points from which
a lawyer is to assess her ability to proceed without compromising her
professional duty to any client.139
The first reference point focuses on the lawyer's personal
interests.140  Included under the rubric of personal interests are:
property interest in which a client may also have an interest;141 a
client business venture in which the lawyer wants to invest;142 the
publication rights to a client's story based on the representation;4
imploring the client to bestow a gift upon the lawyer; 4 4 influencing
137. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, Canon 5.
138. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-1, 5-2.
139. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-1.
140. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-101(A).
141. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-3.
142. Id.
143. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-4.
144. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-5.
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a client to name the lawyer as executor or trustee under an instrument
drafted by the lawyer; 4 ' acquiring an impermissible financial interest
in the outcome of litigation; 146 and deciding whether to employ
additional counsel to assist with the representation. 147  Generally,
these rules provide that the concerns and cares of the client should not
be sacrificed to the lawyer's self-interest. For example, in a tort case
involving multiple family members, a lawyer should not rush a
settlement in the interest of collecting a quick contingency fee.'14  In
handling a divorce, a lawyer should not engage in sexual relations with
a client, especially in light of the emotional turmoil the client is
experiencing.'49 Even if the lawyer and the client are viewed as
consenting adults and the lawyer has disclosed the potential for adverse
affect, "a reasonable lawyer would conclude that the lawyer's interest
would inevitably affect the representation, [and] the client's consent
cannot operate as a waiver of the lawyer's conflicting interest."' °
The second reference point focuses on external forces adversely
influencing or affecting the lawyer's professional judgment."5 '
External forces include other clients the lawyer represents in other
matters; 5 2 multiple clients attempting to obtain an aggregate settle-
ment in the same case; 153 a third party who pays the fee for the
lawyer's client;5 4 or a third party who can exert economic, political
or social pressure on the lawyer.' These forces might be present at
the time a representation is being considered or may arise after the
representation commences. Similar external forces are confronted when
the lawyer specifically represents multiple clients in the same matter.
Typically recurring situations involving potentially differing interests
are those in which a lawyer is asked to represent codefendants in a
criminal case, coplaintiffs in a personal injury case, an insured and
145. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-6.
146. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-7, 5-8.
147. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-11.
148. See WOLFRAM, supra note 57, at 529; Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency
Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L.R. 247 (1996).
149. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 364 (1992).
See also Mussick v. Mussick, 453 S.E.2d 361 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that state's version of the
Model Rules prohibited sexual relations with a client during the representation). The Ohio
Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion under its version of the Model Code in Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. DePietro, 643 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1994).
150. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 308, December 1994.
151. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-105(A)(B)(C).
152. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-105(c).
153. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-106.
154. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-107(A).
155. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-22.
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his insurer, and beneficiaries of the estate of a decedent. Whether
a lawyer can fairly and adequately protect the interests of multiple
clients in these and similar situations depends upon an analysis of
each case. 11
6
With a multiple representation, independent professional judgment
may be adversely affected by a dilution of loyalty"5 7 or by repre-
senting differing interests."'
In determining whether to proceed with a multiple representation,
the lawyer must assess his or her ability to represent each client
without his independent professional judgment being adversely
affected.159 Disciplinary Rule 5-105(c) sets out a standard of obvi-
ousness, stating that it should be "obvious that he can adequately
represent the interests of each .... ",160 The obviousness test requires
a weighing process to assess if the lawyer's "judgment may be impaired
or his loyalty divided .. 6 The rules further recognize that each
case is different and should be analyzed individually.162 Although
the Ethical Considerations speculate that sometimes there may be little
"likeli[ness]" 163 or "chance" '164 of multiple representation having an
adverse effect on the lawyer's independent professional judgment, the
lawyer should avoid all situations where his or her loyalty to the client
would be subject to question.
156. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-17.
157. See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-14, 5-15.
158. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-15.
159. If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple
clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that
his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the
employment. He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation.
Id.
160. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-105(c).
161. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-15.
162. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-17.
163. If the interests vary only slightly, it is generally likely that the lawyer will not be
subjected to an adverse influence and that he can retain his independent judgment on
behalf of each client: and if the interests become differing, withdrawal is less likely to
have a disruptive effect upon the cause of his clients.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-15 (emphasis added).
164. In certain circumstances, there may exist little chance of the judgment of the
lawyer being adversely affected by the slight possibility that the interests will become
actually differing; in other circumstances, the chance of adverse effect upon his judgment
is not unlikely.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-17 (emphasis added).
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B. The Model Rules
The Model Rules have two primary reference points from which
to discuss multiple representation. Each requires an assessment of the
lawyer's ability to proceed without compromising professional duty to
any client. The reference points are suggested by the two parts of
Model Rule 1.7, which establishes the general rule for handling
conflicts of interest.
The first reference point is set out in part (a) of Model Rule 1.7:
"A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client. "165 This rule arises
from the concept of loyalty to the client. Under Model Rule 1.7(a),
loyalty is understood to focus on the relationship with the first
client.166 An attorney should not stab one client in the back by
giving aid and comfort to an adverse party. The principle of loyalty
is expressed in terms of refusing to undertake a representation that is
adverse to the client. The Comments speak of a continuum of
adverseness from direct to unlikely.
167
The second reference point is grounded in the concept of avoiding
representations that may be limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
others or himself. Under part (b) of Model Rule 1.7:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests.
168
The rule directs the lawyer to avoid letting his independent profession-
al judgment be impaired or limited by his obligations or concerns for
others. This is comparable to the Disciplinary Rules under Canon 5
of the Model Code.
The Comments to the Model Rules advise a lawyer to do a self-
assessment of the conflict with the two reference points in mind. The
lawyer should not proceed with the multiple representation, even with
client consent, "when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the
client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances.
.169 This requires the lawyer to conduct a risk assessment for
adverse effect, as suggested by Model Rule 1.7 Comment:
165. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7.
166. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(a).
167. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 3.
168. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(b).
169. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 5.
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The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate
and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's
independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or
foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on
behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the
client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved."'
The key is for the lawyer to determine if he must advocate against a
current client even if the matter is unrelated.'7 1 Further, the lawyer
must assess whether a minimal risk will have an adverse effect on the
relationship or the representation. In a litigation setting, the nature of
the litigation will determine the extent of the risk of adverse effect.'
Loyalty might also be questioned when a lawyer advocates legal
positions for one client that are antagonistic to another client.'73
The risk assessment process should also be conducted in non-
litigation situations, as suggested by Model Rule 1.7 Comment 11:
Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for
adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's
relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being
performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will
arise, and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it
does arise. The question is often one of proximity and degree.
174
As in the litigation setting, the nature of the representation and the
nature of the law involved will inform the assessment process.
Multiple "representation is permissible where the clients are generally
aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest
among them."'7 5
C. Structural Framework
There are significant semantic and structural differences between
the Model Rules and the Model Code in the area of simultaneous
multiple representations. Nevertheless, both sets of rules suggest a
common approach to the specific issue of nonwaivable conflict of
interest. The doctrinal themes, as reflected in the descriptive language
of the rules, require the lawyer to consider two key factors: loyalty and
170. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, Rule 1.7 cmt. 4.
171. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 3.
172. See Tyson v. District Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, 891 P.2d 984 (Colo. 1995).
173. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 8.
174. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, Rule 1.7 cmt. 11.
175. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, Rule 1.7 cmt. 12. See also MODEL RULES, supra note
3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 7.
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zealousness. From the perspective of these two factors, the lawyer
assesses his or her ability to competently provide legal services to
multiple family members in a manner consistent with overall conflict
of interest doctrine. This section further develops the structural
approach to conflicts analysis.
The first common element is a loyalty factor.'76 Loyalty to the
client or clients is fundamental. Any force or factor that dilutes loyalty
should be avoided. This is true whether the rules speak of adverse
interests, differing interests, divergent interests, conflicting interest
(actual or potential), or the adverse effect on the relationship between
the lawyer and the client. The element of loyalty is understood more
clearly in the family context as the following case suggests.
In In re Colestock,'77 a disciplinary proceeding, the attorney
represented a husband and wife in their efforts to be named guardians
and, later, adoptive parents of their niece. The attorney represented
the niece in a personal injury action arising from the automobile
accident that killed the niece's mother (the wife's sister). The attorney
also represented the estate of the niece's mother and had the husband
appointed administrator of the estate. One month after filing the
adoption petition for the couple, the attorney filed a petition for the
dissolution of the marriage on behalf of the wife. The husband
objected to his attorney taking on the divorce representation against
him.
While the court acknowledged the appropriateness of representing
the family in pursuing common objectives,'78 family representation
was inappropriate in that case. The divorce created "discord in [the]
professional relationship," and the lawyer "failed to appreciate the
obligation of undivided loyalty owed by an attorney to every client for
whom he appears and whose interests he must protect."' 79  As long
as the lawyer worked with the family to secure a stable home for the
niece after the tragedy, all interests of the family converged. However,
the adverseness of the divorce action dissolved the family unity and
caused the individual interests to diverge. By representing the wife,
the lawyer was disloyal to the husband and potentially undermined the
work he had previously done for the family.
176. As a practical matter, I would subsume confidentiality under loyalty because a betrayal
of a confidence is a breach of the duty of loyalty. However, I do recognize that confidentiality
could be treated as a separate topic. See, e.g., Collett, supra note 23, at 1468.
177. 461 N.E.2d 137 (Ind. 1984).
178. Id. at 139.
179. Id. at 140.
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The second common element of both the Model Rules and the
Model Code is the zealousness factor. Service and advice should be
freely given so that the client receives the full benefit of the lawyer's
expertise and legal wisdom. The lawyer should not compromise the
dedication to full service because of the various and differing interests
of individual clients.18 The only exception should be when the
clients' interests are generally convergent and no (or minimal) harm
will be done to clients during the representation. Generally, this is
most possible when the legal situation does not place members in an
adversarial position.
The dilemma created when a lawyer attempts to represent family
members with potentially adverse interests is illustrated in In re Boyle's
Case."8' In that case, the attorney represented a father in a criminal
matter while also serving as guardian ad litem (GAL) for the father's
children in a bitter divorce. In the ethics hearing, the court determined
that this was a nonwaivable conflict under Model Rule 1.7(b) because
an assessment of the risk of adverse effect would have lead the lawyer
to reasonably believe that the conflict could not be waived.' 82 The
court further noted, citing to the Comments to Model Rule 1.7, that
a "disinterested lawyer" would not recommend this representation.
18 3
The court sought to distinguish the two different roles the attorney had
assumed in serving different members of the family:
Consequently, because a fundamental conflict exists between the
respondent's role as advocate for the children and his role as
advocate for the father, the [lawyer's] representation of the father
was inappropriate.'84
180. This assumes that part of offering legal services and advice is disclosing all of the
options and allowing the clients to decide for themselves.
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only
after the client has been informed of relevant considerations. . . . A lawyer should
advise his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative. A lawyer should bring
to bear upon this decision-making process the fullness of his experience as well as his
objective viewpoint. In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often
desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which [sic] may lead to a decision that
is morally just as well as legally permissible. He may emphasize the possibility of harsh
consequences that might result from assertion of legally permissible positions. In the
final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether
to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is
ultimately for the client and not for himself.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-8.
181. 611 A.2d 618 (N.H. 1992).
182. Id. at 619.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 620.
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There was a reasonable possibility that, by virtue of the lawyer's
duties as GAL, he might discover facts that would inure to the
detriment of his client." 5 The individual responsibilities in one of
the attorney's roles could cool his zealousness in fulfilling responsibili-
ties in the other role.
What follows from loyalty and zealousness is a third factor shared
by both the Model Codes and the Model Rules: the lawyer must
engage in a self-assessment process to decide for himself the wisdom
of the multiple representation, even if the client is capable of valid
consent after full disclosure. The lawyer should determine whether it
is obvious that the client should not consent or if a disinterested lawyer
would advise against such a multiple representation. It is imperative
that the lawyer be able to provide adequate representation for each
client.
If the conflict is not fundamental, it is possible to provide the
requisite level of representation." 6  This assessment requires a
consideration of the nature of family law and family relationships.
Antenuptial agreements may be handled by one lawyer if the parties
are of similar ability and resources. However, divorces are almost too
adversarial by nature to engage in concurrent representation. When
the goals of the family and each member are united for the common
good, then concurrent representation may be possible. A lawyer who
has provided legal services to a family unit should not turn around and
prosecute the divorce for one of the family members.8
7
IV. HYPOTHETICAL FAMILY PROBLEMS
The hypotheticals presented for this symposium ask whether a
lawyer can provide legal service to a family. 88  My response is.
185. Id.
186. See In re Cohen, 853 P.2d 286. A wife sought legal assistance with a juvenile case and
possible criminal case facing her husband. Both matters arose out of an incident in which the
husband beat and injured the wife's nine-year-old daughter from a previous marriage. A petition
had been filed in juvenile court regarding the nine-year-old, and criminal charges were brought
against the husband. In that case, the lawyer could not represent the family without grossly
disserving the entire family.
187. A lawyer should not attempt to be all things to all family members. See generally
District of Columbia Committee on Legal Ethics, Op. No. 243 (1991).
188. 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, app. at 14 (1998). Hypothetical One Synopsis: Christian
Wife with significant personal wealth desires to let Christian Husband control and manage her
assets, investing them in his fledgling business as he sees fit in his capacity as head of this
conservative Christian family.
Hypothetical Two Synopsis: Physician Wife seeks to have Homemaker Husband relinquish
any marital property rights he might have in medical practice she is preparing to join as a partner.
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premised on the acceptance of Professor Pearce's Optional Family
Representation Model.
Optional Family Representation allows family members to deter-
mine how they will be represented. It provides them with the
option of choosing representation as a collection of individuals under
established conflicts rules or as a family group. Within the family
group, Optional Family Representation protects the ability of each
family member to obtain the information relevant to, and participate
equally in, all decisions, including the option to withdraw from the
family representation at any time.19
I assume that the family has been fully advised of the nature of
the legal services offered and that the lawyer is serving as a legal
facilitator of their goals and objectives. 9 ' As suggested above, the
family consents to the lawyer serving as a legal counselor in a situation
in which their individual interests may be differing or conflicting.
Accordingly, the lawyer must conduct a self-assessment of the risks
involved in providing such services by analyzing the doctrinal elements
of conflict of interest jurisprudence, focusing especially on loyalty and
zealousness. Furthermore, the lawyer must consider whether he or she
can provide the requested services in a manner that honors the family's
concerns and honors the fundamental principles of professionalism.
Before discussing the issues specific to each hypothetical, there are
certain family matters that both hypotheticals have in common. The
structural framework is useful for exploring issues that must be
considered by the lawyer. First, loyalty can be viewed from the
context of the family. As Professor Pearce suggests, the Optional
Family Representation places the interests of the family as a whole into
the forefront.' 9 ' The loyalty is expressed in helping the family
achieve its stated objectives by presenting the full panoply of legal
options, including full exploration of the attendant benefits and
difficulties. This would include observations about the personal,
financial, and legal sacrifices and rewards to which each member would
be subject.
Disloyalty is present when the lawyer actively represents one
family member to the detriment of others who were depending on the
lawyer being neutral among family members. It is also manifested
when the family members begin to express divergent objectives that do
189. Pearce, supra note 22, at 1294.
190. See Steven H. Hobbs, Facilitative Ethics in Divorce Mediation: A Law and Process
Approach, 22 U. RICH. L. REv. 325 (1988).
191. Pearce, supra note 22, at 1301.
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not appear subject to the family's normal process of working out such
relational conflicts. The lawyer, proceeding in the face of unresolvable
family bickering, has strayed from the purpose of Optional Family
Representation.192 Finally, disloyalty is clearly present when the
lawyer handles a family divorce or other legal squabble requiring an
active advocate to vigorously defend his or her clients' rights.
In the hypotheticals presented, both families are pursuing business
ventures that put family financial assets at risk or immediately
compromise a right or privilege grounded in the marital status.
Loyalty in this context requires honoring the philosophical choices
both families have made in constructing their respective families. The
family in hypothetical one honors conservative Christian values, and
the family in hypothetical two honors the family-focused tradition of
the higher salaried spouse in the workforce supporting the other spouse
whose high task it is to be homemaker. We dishonor and are disloyal
to both families when we refuse to respect their chosen paths.'93 We
would also be disloyal to the family if we did not explore the depth
and context of their express, united interests.
Second, the zealousness factor also requires the lawyer to present
the full panoply of options with attendant upsides and downsides. The
wisdom of the lawyer, who is presumably competent to offer advice on
family businesses, gives each family the knowledge necessary for
deciding as a family how the assets should be invested.'94 Recogniz-
ing that, in the context of these two families, one spouse is deferring
to the interests of the other spouse, who is entrusted with pursuing the
family fortune, we know that, at times, this trust is either misplaced or
the vicissitudes of economic life in a free market system make the
decision look foolhardy. But if the family fully understands this, and
consents to it, as did the family in Rico,' we will have given the
family the tools necessary to follow its chosen destiny.
192. Here family systems analysis is particularly helpful to gather information on the family
and to assess how it makes decisions.
193. This responds to the criticism Professor Collett makes about substituting the lawyer's
definition of what is best for the family:
The most serious objection is that the family entity model allows the lawyer to disregard
the expressed objectives of individual family members, and substitute objectives created
from the lawyer's perception of the best interest of the family. Nowhere else are lawyers
permitted such broad-ranging discretion in defining the objectives of representation.
Collett, supra note 23, at 1405.
194. See Steven H. Hobbs and Fay Wilson Hobbs, Family Business and the Business of
Families, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L.R. - n.2 (forthcoming Spring 1998).
195. See supra note 76, and accompanying text.
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Finally, the self-assessment process requires the lawyer to gauge
the family dynamics to determine if the requested services will be used
to pursue a common goal. Admittedly, this is tricky; the family
assessment is complicated by the reality that the united family front
might be thin and even illusory. Legal services should not be provided
to a family if it is obvious that the services call for pitting one family
member against another or if one family member is exceedingly
vulnerable because of such handicaps as domestic violence or substance
abuse.196 In some circumstances, the individual family member's
needs and interests must be protected, and protected by independent
counsel.
The lawyer must check his or her reaction to these family
situations. Is there a bias or prejudice against Christian values or a
more traditional situation in which one person is a homemaker? Is the
concern about dominance in the decision-making so strong that the
lawyer has limited faith in the family's ability to choose its own path?
Can the lawyer adequately handle the legal tasks required in light of
a nonadversarial focus? The lawyer assesses his or her own tempera-
ment and asks whether this family presents a good fit given the context
of its legal and family objectives and the lawyer's skills.
A. Hypothetical One
To offer legal services to this family, I would use the family
systems analysis discussed earlier to gather information about the
family and its interconnected social systems, such as a church or a
Christian community. I would be interested in determining if the
family is united in its articulation of these Christian values. Are the
family members equally yoked to these values or are the values more
hers than his? If the husband views himself as the head of the house,
what sacrifices is he willing to make as he demonstrates the depth of
his unbounded love for her as a Christian man ought? Does their faith
teach them to trust God in all things, even if the business fails and
assets are lost? Do they have access to spiritual resources and advisors
who could prayerfully aid them in their life decisions? I am not
concerned about whether they pass any particular litmus test for
Christian values. I am concerned that they, as a family, operate under
a jointly-held belief system, which then informs me how they
196. Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screening for Domestic Abuse, 23 FL. ST. U.
L. REV. 43 (1995).
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experience the world and make decisions.197 If they operate from the
same point of view and receive the legal, financial, and business
information from me in that light, they should be able to make the best
decision for their family. If I must worry about protecting the wife
from a husband whose actions will not be faith-based, then I should
not proceed as their counselor.
As I suggested earlier, this couple could proceed without the
benefit of my legal knowledge and make it the best way it can.
Ironically, this is how most couples make decisions about utilizing
family assets. A spouse quits a lucrative job to return to school and
change careers. The family relocates to pursue a career opportunity for
one spouse, which causes the other spouse to lose seniority in an
enjoyable or rewarding position. A family business is started using the
family's life savings. In each case, much is at risk and the family
autonomously reaches for goals that may not materialize. In this case,
the magnitude of the family fortune at stake gives one pause. Whether
its one hundred dollars or one million dollars, the decision-making
process is the result of family deliberation. That process should be
honored if the family has chosen the Optional Family Representation
Model and I, as a professional, have assessed both my and their ability
to proceed after full disclosure and consent.
B. Hypothetical Two
In this setting, the husband is asked to forfeit valuable marital
rights. If this were a negotiation for an antenuptial agreement or a
post-marital agreement, I, as lawyer for the bride/wife, would advise
the groom/husband to seek independent counsel and inform him that
my services were dedicated to protecting the bride/wife's interests.
But would I advise the family concerning a document that clearly
restricts the husband's rights? I would in this case if I assessed the
situation as one that promotes the family's best interests, as decided by
the family after full knowledge of the available options and the
opportunity to weigh the results projected over the life of the marriage.
Additionally, I would recommend that the husband seek independent
advice if he is at all in need of reassurance about the wisdom of this
action. 198
197. See D.G. Flemons & P.M. Cole, Connecting and Separating Family and Business: A
Relational Approach to Consultation, 5 FAMILY Bus. REV. 257 (1992).
198. As suggested earlier, the lawyer is here serving as a facilitator of family goals and
objectives in the special context of the whole family. In a work on mediation ethics, I suggested
an approach that is analogous to this situation:
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Clearly, the primary concern is whether the wife's perceived
dominance in this situation is such that serving as counsel for this
family would only enhance the control she seems to have to the
husband's detriment.199 Part of my reluctance to proceed is my
awareness of the contemporary version of the Golden Rule: he or she
who has the GOLD gets to make the RULE! While this is troubling,
it should be placed in the context of the variety of forms family
dynamics take. One, it is not realistic to assume that in any marital
relationship power is shared equally. Two, even if the partners have
egalitarian ideas about relationships, in some decisions one or both of
the partners must yield and compromise must be sought if they are to
avoid irreconcilable differences. And, finally, it is their decision to
make and not their lawyer's. If I, in my capacity as legal counsel,
believe that the decision-making authority should be equally shared,
then I probably should not accept this engagement because I could not
honor their decision-making process.
My best advice could be given if I step back and view the longer
history of this family and glimpse where it dreams of heading in the
future. First the wife, as a doctor, has to assess her career opportuni-
ties if this one is not realized. Is this ultimately a good move for the
family? Input from the rest of the family should be encouraged.
Second, we should view this situation as one in which the family is
related to the practice in unique ways. Certainly, the practice provides
a lucrative income for the family. But also, the family derives benefits
from the practice being divorce-proofed from the other doctors and
their spouses.2 °° And finally, can the family negotiate other benefits
The facilitation principle further assumes that what is at stake is a significant change in
the way attorneys practice in the family law setting. The neutral lawyer's ethical
conduct should embody his new role as facilitator of family dispute resolution[,] which
society has demanded of the profession. In restructuring family relationships, the
attorney should not minimize the parties' legal responsibilities nor try to maximize
individual personal benefits to the financial and emotional detriment of the other spouse.
Such a course of conduct has a negative effect on marital partners as well as on the very
fabric of society.
Hobbs, supra note 190, at 364.
199. See Blum v. Blum, 477 A.2d 289 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
200. The concept of divorce-proofing recognizes the realities of modern married life and the
negative impact this could have on a business if it is not protected by prenuptial agreements,
family trusts or buy/sell agreements:
With a generation of family-business owners getting ready to retire and almost half of
all marriages failing, the issue of keeping company ownership in family hands is more
pressing than ever. Yet few business-owning families actually take steps to prevent
divorce proceedings from jeopardizing their wealth, thereby leaving their life work
exposed to lengthy, expensive, and often bitter legal battles over financial settlements.
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from the practice in lieu of a marital interest being found at divorce?
Other family protection could be provided, such as life insurance
reflecting the value of the partnership interest or a pension or other
savings plan that could protect the family from financial troubles.
With Optional Family Representation, the family's greater interests
can be pursued if that is the family's desire.
CONCLUSION
Families come in a variety of shapes and sizes. They function as
cohesive units, battle with royal abandon, or exist as distant strangers.
Regardless of the form, families need a myriad of legal services. A
single lawyer can meet the unique needs of a family if, after fully
disclosing and explaining the competing ethical parameters of such an
engagement, the lawyer assesses his or her ability to appropriately and
professionally perform the tasks at hand. The lawyer should factor in
the obligation to remain loyal to the family and its stated goals and
values, while not overreaching the agreed upon task by using his or her
legal skills against an individual family member. Additionally, the
lawyer should factor in the obligation to pursue zealously the stated
goals of the family, recognizing and honoring its ability to make tough,
individual choices for the family's good.
The analysis done by the lawyer is framed by the doctrinal themes
flowing from the language of conflict of interest rules. Further,
additional guidance can be found in the general professional standards
inspired by the codes of ethics and the individual lawyer's "exercise of
sensitive professional and moral judgment." '' The context of the
family's system should also aid the analysis as the lawyer brings her
practice experience and family counseling skills derived from the
sensitive understanding of family dynamics. In the end, the lawyer
will know whether the conflicts inherent in providing legal services to
multiple family members can be managed or are such that, even with
consent of all concerned, the conflict of interest should not be waived.
Abby Livingston, Make Your Family Business 'Divorce-Proof', 85/1 NATION'S BUSINESS 64 (Jan.
1997).
201. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Preamble.
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